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A Comparative Study of the European 
Stability Mechanism with the Troubled 
Asset Relief Program of the United 
States 
Tanu Sinha* 
Abstract: This article presents a comparative study of the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program (TARP), established by the U.S. Treasury during the 2008 financial 
crisis, and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), a permanent bail-out fund 
established by the European Union (EU) in 2012. The article begins by intro-
ducing the European Union and the Sovereign Debt Crisis briefly, and discusses 
TARP and its impact on the United States economy. Then the article summarizes 
the evolution of ESM along with the bail-out programs that have been provided 
by ESM and its predecessors. The article then outlines the similarities and dif-
ferencesbetween ESM and TARP, particularly in the accountability structures of 
the two programs, and finally, analyzes the current situation in the European 
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In October 2012, the European Union (“EU”) established a permanent 
bailout fund called the European Stability Mechanism (“ESM”).1 Its main 
function is to provide liquidity to the Euro Area Member States through a 
variety of financial instruments.2 Its objectives and functions are very simi-
lar to the Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”) established by the U.S. 
Treasury during the 2008 financial crisis.3 However, in retrospect, there is 
much debate over whether the TARP was the right response.4 This paper 
introduces the European Union and the Sovereign Debt Crisis briefly, dis-
cusses TARP and its impact on the United States economy, summarizes the 
evolution of ESM along with the bailout programs that have been provided 
by ESM and its predecessors, outlines the similarities and differences be-
tween ESM and TARP, particularly in the accountability structures of the 
two programs, and finally, analyzes the current situation in the European 
Union and how the region could achieve sustainable stability. 
II. EUROPEAN UNION AND THE SOVEREIGN DEBT 
CRISIS: A BACKGROUND 
The European Union was an unprecedented attempt to establish inter-
governmental peace and cooperation in a war-torn Europe after World War 
II. What started out as the European Steel and Coal Community with six 
members has evolved today into a powerful organization with twenty-eight 
members.5 The evolution can be traced through certain key treaties: The 
Treaty of Paris, the Treaties of Rome, the Treaty of Maastricht, the Treaty 
of Nice, and most recently, the Treaty of Lisbon.6 
The Treaties of Rome, signed in 1957, created the European Economic 
Community (“EEC”).7 The EEC established a common market and free 
trade between the six signatory member nations.8 A decade later, in 1967, 
                                                          
 1 Matina Stevis, Key Facts About the ESM, WALL ST. J.: REAL TIME BRUSSELS, (Sep. 12, 
2012, 10:02AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/brussels/2012/09/12/key-facts-about-the-esm.  
 2 Id. 
 3 Thomas Cooley, Matthew Richardson, & Kermit Schoenholtz, Europe’s Banks 
Need a TARP of Their Own, BLOOMBERG: BLOOMBERGVIEW, (June 18, 2012, 
6:30PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2012-06-18/saving- 
euro-starts-with-banks-cooley-richardson-schoenholtz. 
 4 Danielle Kurtzleben, The Case for and Against TARP, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REPORT (May 24, 2011, 4:41PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2011/05/ 
24/the-case-for-and-against-tarp. 
 5 The World Factbook: European Union, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ee.html 
(last updated Oct. 31, 2017).  
 6 See id.  
 7 Id.  
 8 Id.  
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the EEC was expanded to create the European Community (“EC”).9 The EC 
established a single Commission, a Council of Ministers, and the European 
Parliament.10 The EC continued growing in membership in the intervening 
years, until in 1992, when the Maastricht Treaty expanded it to include 
wide-ranging intergovernmental cooperation in diverse fields such as for-
eign policy, defence, internal affairs, and economic and monetary policy.11 
The economic and monetary policy cooperation created the European Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union (“EMU”), which is commonly referred to as the 
Eurozone.12 The Maastricht Treaty laid the foundation for the European Un-
ion and the Eurozone that we know today. 
The Treaty of Nice tried to institute greater integration by establishing 
a constitution for the EU.13 The proposal was rejected in the referenda held 
in France and Netherlands.14 The effort was renewed in the Treaty of Lis-
bon, and was successful the second time around in achieving the original 
vision of integration envisioned by the Treaty of Nice.15 The Treaty of Lis-
bon established the EU as the successor of the EC, replacing it and provid-
ing the Treaty on European Union (“TEU”) and the Treaty on the Function-
ing of the European Union (“TFEU”).16 
The common currency, the euro, came into existence in 1999 and was 
initially adopted by eleven member states.17 In the meantime, the EU con-
tinued growing, increasing its membership to the current size of twenty-
eight.18 Only nineteen states of the twenty-eight use the common currency.19 
                                                          
 9 Id.  
 10 Id.  
 11 Maastricht Treaty, BBC NEWS: IN DEPTH: EURO GLOSSARY (Apr. 30, 2011, 
11:51AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/europe/euro-glossary/1216944.stm.  
 12 Id.; Euro Area – EMU, OECD (Apr. 17, 2013), https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/ 
detail.asp?ID=862. 
 13 See Bruno Waterfield, Lisbon Treaty Q & A: Your Guide to What It Means 
and What Happens Next, THE TELEGRAPH (Sept. 4, 2009), http://www.telegraph.co. 
uk/news/majornews/6257617/Lisbon-Treaty-Q-and-A-your-guide-to-what-it-means 
-and-what-happens-next.html. 
 14 Id. 
 15 See id. 
 16 Kyriakos Fountoukakos, Kristien Geeurickx and Jacques Buhart, The Lisbon 
Treaty – brief overview of the key changes, LEXOLOGY (Nov. 4, 2009), https:// 
www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=48a4327a-c5e8-41a7-8000-c93e90ab 
e763.  
 17 Edmund L. Andrews, Outlook 1999: International; With Euro, Europe Rein-
vents Itself, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 04, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/01/04/ 
business/outlook-1999-international-with-euro-europe-reinvents-itself.html.  
 18 Will Martin, The Entire History of the Euro in One Chart, BUSINESS INSIDER 
(Jan. 03, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/knight-frank-chart-on-the-history-
of-the-euro-2017-1. 
 19 Id. 
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Title VIII of the TFEU lays the foundation of the economic and mone-
tary union.20  While the treaty creates a strong monetary union and the un-
ion exercises authority over the monetary policies, economic and fiscal pol-
icy are left primarily to the discretion of the member states.21 Article 127 of 
the TFEU establishes that the European Central Bank (“ECB”) would con-
duct the monetary policy of the union in conjunction with and supported by 
the National Central Banks of the member states of the EMU.22 The ECB 
and National Central Banks of the Eurozone member nations constitute the 
European System of Central Banks (also referred to as the Eurosystem to 
differentiate them from the system of banks supporting the twenty-eight 
member EU).23  
Article 125 of the TFEU calls for a “no bailout” policy for the Europe-
an Union.24 In the face of this policy and the lack of fiscal integration be-
tween the member nations, the economic health of the union depends large-
ly on member states exercising discipline over their individual fiscal 
policies.25 Article 126 of the TFEU establishes guidelines on monitoring 
and enforcing this fiscal discipline.26 Historically, the member nations of 
the EU agreed on a pact to ensure fiscal discipline.27 This pact was called 
the Stability and Growth Pact (“SGP”) and was adopted in 1997.28 Howev-
er, the SGP did not have clout over the member nations and was found to be 
a weak form of control over national government spending in the member 
nations of the EMU.29 Most members failed to strictly follow the rules set 
forth by the SGP.30 In 2011, right in the midst of the sovereign debt crisis, 
significant amendments were introduced to strengthen the SGP.31 These 
were called the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack.32 Most recently, these amend-
ments were followed by the 2012 Treaty on Stability, Coordination, and 
Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (commonly referred to 
                                                          
 20 Vassilis Paliouras, Why Europe Should Say “No” to the Proposed Framework 
of Economic Governance: A Legal and Policy Analysis in Light of the Establish-
ment of the European Stability Mechanism and the Euro Plus Pact, 15 TOURO 
INT’L L. REV. 39, 41 (2012). 
 21 Id. at 42.  
 22 René Smits, The Crisis Response in Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union: 
Overview of Legal Developments, 38 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1135, 1139 (2015). 
 23 Id. at 1139.   
 24 See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union art. 125, Sept. 5, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47, 99 [hereinafter TFEU].   
 25 See Smits, supra note 22, at 1140-41. 
 26 See TFEU art. 126, supra note 24.  
 27 See Smits, supra note 22, at 1141. 
 28 See id. at 1141-42.  
 29 Id. at 1142.  
 30 Id.  
 31 Id. at 1144. 
 32 Id. at 1145-50.  
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as the “Fiscal Compact” or TSCG).33 
The Fiscal Compact is different from the earlier initiatives in that it 
mandates that the member states implement national laws that require a bal-
anced national budget, i.e., it requires an amendment to national constitu-
tions (or the national equivalent to a constitution) requiring national gov-
ernments to maintain a balanced budget.34 It also empowers member nations 
to bring suits against another member that is violating this requirement in 
the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”).35 Member nations have given up 
significant control over their budgetary sovereignty under the Fiscal Com-
pact.36 
The divergence between how the monetary policy is exercised versus 
how the economic and fiscal policy is exercised creates a disconnect that is 
largely responsible for the crisis the European Union is currently facing.37 
The loss of monetary policy to the ECB had unforeseen, and in retrospect, 
catastrophic impact to the economies of certain member states.38 The ECB’s 
policy was based on averages, trying to establish a policy that would work 
“on average” for all economies that are a part of the EMU.39 However, this 
view ignores the very real differences existing between the economies of 
the member nations—Germany’s economy is fundamentally different from 
that of Ireland’s, France’s from that of Greece’s.40 There was no one single 
formula that fit all in this situation. This led to a monetary policy that creat-
ed bubbles in economies like those of Spain and Ireland and encouraged ir-
responsible fiscal spending in economies such as Greece.41 
Initially, during the boom between the years of 2003 to 2007, there 
was not much attention paid to how ECB’s policy was impacting the fiscal 
policies of member states.42 As mentioned above, states were not adhering 
strictly to the requirements under the SGP. It was only after the credit crisis 
of 2008, which led to a massive revaluation of assets and bursting of the re-
al estate boom across the globe, that red flags were raised on the debt levels 
of member nations of the EMU (beginning with Greece).43 Late in 2009, af-
ter Greece grossly violated the deficit to GDP ratio required by the TFEU 
due to a revaluation of the deficit levels, Greece’s debt ratings were down-
                                                          
 33 Id. at 1151.   
 34 Id.   
 35 Id. at 1152. 
 36 See id. at 1151-52.  
 37 See id. at 1143.  
 38 Id.  
 39 See id.  
 40 See id.  
 41 Id.  
 42 Philip R. Lane, The European Sovereign Debt Crisis, 26 J. ECON. PERSP. 49, 
54 (2012). 
 43 Id. at 56. 
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graded.44 The downgrade saw widening spreads between the yields on the 
sovereign bonds of Greece versus other countries in the EMU.45 There was 
a domino effect where other countries with high debt to GDP ratios saw 
widening yield spreads and credit rating downgrades: Ireland and Portugal 
between late 2010 to early 2011, with Spain and Italy following in 2011.46    
Although the sovereign debt crisis seems to be a very different animal 
compared to the financial crisis in the United States that was precipitated by 
the real estate crash, their effects have been strikingly similar in freezing the 
credit markets and drying up liquidity.47 Before delving into the particulars 
of ESM and its impact on the EU economy, it would be helpful to consider 
how the United States responded to and contained the credit crisis. The next 
section discusses the TARP set up in the United States to counter the impact 
of the 2008 financial crisis. 
III. TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM 
In March 2008, Bear Stearns collapsed and was subsequently bought 
by J.P. Morgan Chase for a deeply discounted price of $10.00 per share.48 
An emergency loan from the Federal Reserve of New York had been un-
successful in saving the bank once the losses on securitized mortgage prod-
ucts started piling up rapidly.49 This was the beginning of a financial melt-
down that almost completely froze capital markets in the United States and 
to a large extent, internationally. The weekend that Lehman Brothers went 
bankrupt also stands out as a key event in the financial panic of 2008.50 
Merrill Lynch was also on the brink of a very similar fate before being ac-
quired by Bank of America the very same weekend.51 A week before, on 
September 7, 2008, the federal government had nationalized Federal Na-
tional Mortgage Association and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corpo-
ration after billions of dollars were written off by these organizations as bad 
loans.52 The Federal Reserve and Treasury were stretched beyond their 
means and were still unable to contain the panic in the financial markets. 
After the Lehman collapse, the Treasury Secretary, Henry Paulson, ap-
proached Congress with a proposal to purchase $700 billion of securitized 
                                                          
 44 Id.  
 45 Id.  
 46 Id. at 57.  
 47 See Nelson D. Schwartz, Financial Turmoil Evokes Comparison to 2008 Cri-
sis, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2011, at A1. 
 48 Joshua Ruby, Sound and Fury, Confused Alarms, (Fn2) and Oversight: Con-
gress, Delegation, and Effective Responses to Financial Crises, 47 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 209, 213 (2010). 
 49 Id. at 213. 
 50 See id. at 213. 
 51 Id.  
 52 Id.  
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mortgage products that were behind the collapse of the markets.53 Although 
the House of Representatives did not pass the initial draft of the bill, by Oc-
tober 3, 2008, an expanded bill with added legislation on areas such as tax 
and energy was passed successfully and signed into law by President 
George W. Bush as the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (“EESA”).54 
The authority to purchase troubled assets as part of TARP under EESA was 
set to expire on December 31, 2009.55 The key aims of EESA and TARP 
were to ensure that families did not lose their homes, troubled assets were 
removed from the balance sheets of financial institutions, and that the tax-
payers’ interest were protected while achieving the first two aims.56 
Congress delegated its TARP oversight responsibilities to four bodies 
under the EESA: The Financial Stability Oversight Board (“FSOB”), the 
Special Inspector General for the Troubled Assets Relief Program 
(“SIGTARP”), the Congressional Oversight Panel (“Panel”), and the Gov-
ernment Accountability Office (“GAO”).57 Congress retained supervisory 
oversight over these bodies.58 While FSOB and SIGTARP were executive 
bodies, the latter two (Panel and GAO) were legislative bodies.59 The FSOB 
was responsible for monitoring and reporting on the effectiveness of the 
program and for recommending new or different courses of actions for the 
Treasury.60 SIGTARP was responsible for monitoring TARP for fraud and 
abuse.61 The Panel was tasked with producing monthly oversight reports on 
whether the Treasury was successful in stabilizing the US economy.62 The 
Panel also had the power to hold hearings.63 GAO was the implementation 
oversight arm of the legislative branchin its bimonthly reports it reviewed 
the effectiveness of TARP and the acquisitions made by the program.64 It 
was also responsible for an annual audit of TARP.65   
However, on October 28, 2008, soon after President Bush signed the 
EESA under TARP, nine banks received liquidity injection from the Treas-
                                                          
 53 Id. 
 54 Breakdown of the Final Bailout Bill, WASH. POST (Sep. 28, 2008, 12:23 PM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/09/28/AR2008 
092800900.html. 
 55 Id.  
 56 See Ruby, supra note 48. 
 57 Id. at 209. 
 58 Id.  
 59 Id. at 216. 
 60 Id. at 217.  
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. at 218.  
 63 Id.  
 64 Id.  
 65 Id.  
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ury through the Capital Purchase Program.66 As part of this program, the 
Treasury purchased $250 billion worth of preferred equity in the nine par-
ticipating banks.67 The participating banks were: Goldman Sachs Group 
Inc., Morgan Stanley, J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., Bank of America Corp. 
(which had just agreed to purchase Merrill Lynch), Citigroup Inc., Wells 
Fargo & Co., Bank of New York Mellon, and State Street Corp.68 
The Capital Purchase Program was designed to function through a 
voluntary election by the bank to apply for a credit line to their principle fi-
nancial regulator.69 However, there was controversy surrounding the banks’ 
willingness to sell their preferred stock to the Treasury.70 The meeting of 
the Chief Executive Officers of the nine banks with the Treasury Secretary, 
Mr. Paulson, was fraught with tension and there were banks amongst the 
nine that did not want to participate in the program at all.71 They felt that 
their balance sheets were healthy and did not require a capital injection 
from the government.72 
The other key initiatives undertaken as part of TARP were: the Com-
munity Development Capital Initiative (“CDCI”), Capital Assistance Pro-
grams (“CAP”), American International Group (“AIG”) Investments, Tar-
geted Investment Program (“TIP”), Asset Guarantee Program (“AGP”), 
Automotive Industry Support Program (“AISP”), Credit Market Program 
(“CMP”), Public Private Investment Program (“PPIP”), and TARP Housing 
Programs.73 
The CDCI invested capital, up to $570 million, into Community De-
velopment Financial Institutions.74 These institutions operate in markets 
that are not served by mainstream financial institutions.75 The CAP was an 
initiative to develop and implement exhaustive “stress tests” to help assess 
the health of key bank holding companies in the United States.76 The stress 
tests were helpful in restoring confidence in the financial markets and banks 
                                                          
 66 Capital Purchase Program, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, https://www.treasury. 
gov/initiatives/financial-stability/tarp-programs/bank-investment-programs/cap/ 
pages/default.aspx (last updated Dec. 31, 2015, 10:06AM).  
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Mark Lander & Eric Dash, Drama Behind a Banking Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
14, 2008, at A1. 
 70 Id.  
 71 Id.  
 72 Daniel G. Murray & William H. Quirk III, Capital Purchase Program Funds: 
Thanks, But Maybe No Thanks, BANK ACCT. & FIN., Jun-Jul. 2009, at 42 (2009). 
 73 OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT: 
ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, FISCAL YEAR 2017, at 342-45 (2016). 
 74 Id. at 342. 
 75 Id.  
 76 Id.  
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were able to raise capital from the private sector after the results of the suc-
cessful tests were published.77 
Under the AIG Investments plan, by December 31, 2008, the Treasury 
had invested $40 billion into buying preferred shares of AIG.78 The Treas-
ury’s rationale was to mitigate systemic risks from a collapse of AIG.79 AIG 
underwent recapitalization and restructuring followed by an IPO in May 
2011.80 After the IPO, the Treasury had a stake of 77% in the company, 
down from 92% in January 2011.81 After several public offerings in the next 
two years, the Treasury exited their position in the company fully.82 
TARP’s investments into AIG totalled $67.8 billion, of which $55.3 billion 
was recovered by the time the Treasury exited the program.83 
TIP’s aim was to stabilize financial institutions that were considered 
critical for the stability of the financial system.84 Under this program, the 
Treasury invested $20 billion in preferred stock of Citigroup and another 
$20 billion in preferred stock of Bank of America.85 By December 2009, 
both banks had repaid the investments along with $3 billion in dividend 
payments.86 The program cost the Treasury $40 billion and yielded $44.4 
billion.87 
AGP was established to guarantee assets held by financial institutions 
considered to be critical to the financial system of the United States.88 Un-
der this program, losses of up to $5 billion were guaranteed by the Treasury 
on Citigroup’s $301 billion portfolio.89 A claim was never made and the 
program yielded $3.9 billion in cash back for the federal government.90 
AISP was established to prevent the collapse of the automotive indus-
try in December 2008.91 TARP provided emergency loans to Chrysler, 
Chrysler Financial, and GM under this program.92 TARP also invested in 
the financial arm of GM called GMAC (later Ally Financial) and helped 
                                                          
 77 Id.  
 78 Id. at 343.  
 79 Id.  
 80 Id.  
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id.  
 84 Id.  
 85 Id.  
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. at 344. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. 
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Chrysler and GM with their bankruptcy proceedings.93 Under this program, 
TARP invested a total of $79.7 billion and received $70.5 billion in cash 
back.94 CAP provided lending for consumers and small businesses through 
loan facilities and programs.95 
PPIP was established to help financial institutions remove mortgage 
backed securities from their balance sheets.96 Under this program, public-
private investment funds were set up to buy securities from financial institu-
tions (since the private market for these securities had dried up).97 By No-
vember 30, 2015, this program involved an investment of $18.6 billion and 
yielded $22.5 billion.98 
TARP Housing Programs were aimed at ensuring that families did not 
lose their homes to foreclosure.99 The programs provided financing for 
mortgages to homeowners who were making a good faith effort to repay 
their debts.100 The program also aimed to contain the spill-over effects of 
foreclosures.101 
As is evident by the breadth of programs undertaken as part of TARP 
and the magnitude of taxpayer funds committed to it, it was an unprece-
dented effort to stabilize the economy. The next section considers the im-
pact of the program and discusses whether TARP was successful in its mis-
sion.   
IV. IMPACT OF TARP ON THE US ECONOMY 
There are divergent views on how TARP impacted the US Economy in 
retrospect. While it has largely been credited as being instrumental in 
stemming the wave of bankruptcies during the crisis and bringing stability 
to a panicked financial markets,102 many critics have found TARP to have 
been woefully lacking in addressing the needs of the wider population dur-
ing a moment of immense financial turbulence.103   
                                                          
 93 Id.  
 94 Id.  
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. at 345. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id.  
 102 See Jonathan Weisman, U.S. Declares Banks and Auto Bailouts Over, and 
Profitable, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2014, at B1.  
 103 See The Editorial Board, Editorial, The Real Bailout Victims, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 23, 2014, at A26; see also Emergency Economic Stabilization Act: One Year 
Later Before the Subcomm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 
(2009) (testimony of Elizabeth Warren, Chairwoman, Congressional Oversight 
Panel, Troubled Asset Relief Program).  
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In its final report published in March 2011, the Congressional Over-
sight Panel (“COP”) critically analyzed the impact of TARP.104 The COP 
found that the program was an extremely high-risk undertaking for the gov-
ernment, especially when using the taxpayers’ money to fund the pro-
gram.105 If there had been another wave of bankruptcies or if the recovery 
had not proceeded as planned, the program could have lost the federal gov-
ernment trillions.106 The program further fed into the financial markets per-
ception of large banks being “too big to fail” and smaller banks not having 
the same protection.107 This implicit assumption was built into the borrow-
ing costs of these institutions in the financial markets, leading to higher 
costs for smaller actors and discounted costs for the larger actors.108 This 
further incentivized large banks to take federal protection for granted in the 
future, creating moral hazard problems.109 
Capital injection using TARP sent out a strong negative signal to the 
financial markets about the health of the participating banks. Of the nine 
banks that participated initially in the program, many were hesitant to ac-
cept the investment into their preferred equity stock because they expected 
private investors to interpret it as a sign of weakness.110 In an environment 
of financial panic and chaos, even a minute negative signal to the market 
could potentially lead to substantive loss in stock value.111 The potential 
participants also worried about greater regulatory scrutiny by the regulators 
in the future if they decided to participate.112 A study on the impact of Capi-
tal Purchase Program on the stock performance of participating banks indi-
cated that these banks underperformed the non-participating banks by 5.6% 
during the period the program was initiated.113 However, after the initiation, 
the valuation of the bank stocks adjusted upward such that they were out-
performing the non-participating banks by 10.3 percent.114 The research 
                                                          
 104 See CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL: MARCH OVERSIGHT REPORT: THE 
FINAL REPORT OF THE OVERSIGHT PANEL (2011).  
 105 Id. at 2.  
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id.  
 109 See id.  
 110 See Murray & Quirk III, supra note 72, at 42.  
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found that banks with stronger fundamentals were more likely to participate 
in the program, i.e. the banks that participated in CPP were generally more 
profitable and had lower ratio of non-performing to total loans compared to 
the non-participating banks.115 Given this, the devaluation in the stock was 
likely due to negative investor sentiment existing in the market.116 This sen-
timent reversed post-initiation period of the CPP, the study suggests, as a 
result of positive stress test results for the banks, early repayments by the 
banks of the capital injections, and regular payments on the investment 
made by TARP.117    
Further, there were concerns over transparency and accountability of 
the program.118 TARP was conceived originally for the purchase of troubled 
assets; however, a majority of its initiatives went towards injecting capital 
in the form of equity purchases. 
When TARP purchased equity of banks under the CPP, there was no 
way of determining whether the capital was used to divest the bad assets or 
was diverted towards something else.119 There was widespread public anger 
over the program that seemed to be handing taxpayer money to large banks 
while it was ineffective in ensuring that people were not losing their 
homes.120 The COP report found that TARP had failed in ensuring that the 
tide of foreclosures was stemmed.121  
Having considered the structure and impact of TARP in detail, we are 
now in a position to pivot our attention towards European Stability Mecha-
nism and its role in helping the EU manage the sovereign debt crisis. Fun-
damentally, ESM and TARP are both programs involving direct liquidity 
injection into economies dealing with frozen credit markets. The next sec-
tion lays out the structure of ESM and its impact in stabilizing the EU coun-
tries that were most severely impacted by the crisis. 
V. EUROPEAN STABILITY MECHANISM: HISTORY AND 
EVOLUTION 
The objectives and functions of the ESM are very similar to those of 
TARP. It is the most recent step in a long series of steps by the European 
Union to contain a sovereign debt crisis that has raised existential doubts 
for the union. Yield spreads widened considerably for the EU countries 
burdened with rising sovereign debt, leading to them being locked out from 
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the bond markets.122 The EMU member states agreed that intervention was 
required to ensure that liquidity was available to the economic ecosystem of 
these countries.123 This intervention took the form of direct financial aid, 
leading to several temporary measures to help the affected nations, ranging 
from loans from the International Monetary Fund124 to ad hoc bailout funds 
such as the European Financial Stability Mechanism (“EFSM”)125 and the 
European Financial Stability Fund (“EFSF”).126 Finally, and most recently, 
the ESM was established as a permanent bailout fund for the region.127 So 
far, five countries have received aid from these vehicles: Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal, Spain, and Cyprus.128   
The EFSM was established in early 2010, authorizing the EU Com-
mission to raise money from financial institutions and to then lend that 
money to the impacted nation.129 The EFSF was established outside of the 
European Union, as a corporation under the jurisdiction of Luxembourg.130  
The EMU member states were the shareholders of the corporation.131 To 
raise capital for providing aid to struggling member nations, EFSF issued 
bonds in the capital market insured by collateral posted by the shareholders 
as paid in capital to the corporation.132 The EFSF, through its capacity to 
raise capital as a corporation, had access to provide significantly higher 
amount of aid compared to EFSM.133 
The ESM is a permanent bailout fund, which was established in Octo-
ber 2012.134 Similar to EFSF, ESM was established out the European Union 
by an ad hoc treaty, a treaty establishing the European Stability Mecha-
nism.135 It replaces EFSF and is structured similarly as an intergovernmen-
tal organization established as a corporation under the laws of Luxem-
bourg.136 TFEU was amended to include verbiage in Article 136 indicating 
that the member states of EMU could establish a bailout fund to stabilize 
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the euro if required.137 
The Euro area member states are ESM’s shareholders and provide a to-
tal capital stock of €704.8 billion, divided according to a “contribution key” 
amongst the member states.138 ESM has a board of governors, a board of 
directors and a board of auditors.139 The Board of Governors is composed of 
finance ministers of the member states of EMU.140 Each member state se-
lects a governor on the board and the governor appoints a director and an 
alternate director to the board of directors.141 The Board of Auditors is 
composed of five members appointed by the Board of Governors.142 The 
Managing Director of the ESM is appointed for a term of five years and is 
the legal representative of the organization.143 Each of the three governance 
bodies has specific functions described in the ESM bylaws, Rules of Proce-
dures, and various ESM Guidelines.   
ESM is capitalized through paid-in capital and committed callable cap-
ital of its shareholders.144 Currently, the paid-in capital equals €80.5 billion 
and the committed callable capital equals €624.3 billion, leading to a total 
capital of €704.8 billion.145 The lending capacity of ESM is a maximum of 
€500 billion.146 ESM uses its subscribed capital to raise money in the capital 
markets through the issuance of financial instruments to a variety of inves-
tors.147 It can provide aid to member states of EMU who have been shut out 
of the bond markets through six key instruments: stability support loan, 
primary and secondary market support facility, indirect recapitalization, di-
rect recapitalization, and preventative credit lines.148   
VI. BAILOUTS FACILITATED THROUGH THE ESM AND ITS 
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PREDECESSORS 
This section delves deeper into the problems experienced by the econ-
omies of the five countries that have received aid from ESM, and its prede-
cessors, and investigates the impact of these bailouts. 
Greece 
Greece was the first EMU member state to find itself on the brink of 
default in 2009.149 In May 2009, the new post-election government in 
Greece announced that the debt figures for that year had to be revised up-
wards from 6.0 to 12.7 percent.150 This large and unexpected revision was 
followed by the Greek government’s retrospective adjustment of debt fig-
ures for the past several years.151 It was found that Greece had been report-
ing much lower figures for its debt to GDP ratio than what it should have 
been.152 Further investigation revealed that Greece was able to do this 
through buying derivatives from investment banks, such as interest rate 
swaps, that had a long-term payout policy.153 Neither the derivatives, nor 
the payouts were included in the debt calculations as they were not consid-
ered to be loans held by the government.154 Eurostat, the European Union’s 
statistical office, published a report in January 2010 with allegations of 
fraudulent data.155 
Greece owed its creditors $300 billion and most of that debt was held 
by banks, both domestic and international.156 This was a situation very simi-
lar to the “too big to fail” banks in the United States. It was thought that a 
default would create panic in the financial markets, which would thus freeze 
lending for a protracted amount of time. 
In May 2010, The European Commission set up the Greek Loan Fa-
cility to provide bilateral loans of up to €80 billion over the period of May 
2010 to June 2013.157 The final amount disbursed was much lower at €2.7 
billion.158 This was in conjunction with €30 billion provided by the IMF 
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under a standby arrangement.159 On March 14, 2012, a second bailout pro-
gram was instituted for Greece.160 The undisbursed amount from GLF along 
with an additional €130 billion was to be provided.161 This program was to 
be financed primarily through EFSF, a predecessor of ESM.162 Until June 
2015, a total of €164.5 billion were disbursed through this program—144.7 
billion from the EFSF and 19.8 billion from the IMF.163 After the second 
bailout program expired, the Greek government made a formal request for 
further capital on July 8, 2015.164 This bailout was financed through the 
ESM—the first disbursement of €13 billion was made on August 20, 2015 
and an additional €10 billion was earmarked for bank recapitalization.165 
The first disbursement was closely followed by the signature of an MoU be-
tween the EMU and Greece that contains wide-ranging fiscal policy condi-
tionality.166   
Ireland 
Ireland’s economy entered a severe recession in 2008.167 Until 2007, 
Ireland had been experiencing a boom in economy founded primarily on 
rising housing prices and high labor productivity in its construction sec-
tor.168 The rise in construction and subsequent housing prices was driven by 
Irish financial institutions offering mortgages at extremely low rates com-
pared to the historical precedent.169 The growth in house completions can be 
seen through the extraordinary numbers: total stock of houses stood at 1.2 
million in 1991, rising to 1.4 million by 2000, and then rapidly increasing to 
1.9 million by 2008.170 Similarly, house completions went from 19,000 in 
1990 to 50,000 in 2000 and exploding to 93,000 in 2006.171 The boom in 
the economy was fuelled single-handedly by the housing demand and the 
construction industry.172 
The gross overvaluation of the housing prices started correcting itself 
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after the financial crisis in the United States triggered a worldwide slow-
down.173 There was a halt in the construction activities, a fall in the demand 
for houses and a consequent fall in housing prices.174 The collapse in the 
construction industry led to high unemployment as this was the industry 
that had singlehandedly created the booming economy and employed a 
large number of people in the workforce.175 This was the beginning of a fis-
cal collapse for Ireland. With high unemployment, tax revenues collected 
by the government fell sharply along with an increased outflow of social 
welfare payments.176 A decline in real GDP with a magnitude of up to 10 
percent combined with decrease in tax revenues and increased social wel-
fare payments led to a sudden increase in the country’s debt to GDP ratio.177 
The final straw for the Irish economy was a banking crisis that followed 
bursting of the construction bubble and increasing sovereign debt.178 Irish 
banks had large exposure to the real estate market through the mortgage 
loans.179 With the real estate market declining, investors became increasing-
ly hesitant to lend money to these banks, eventually freezing them out of 
the bond markets.180  In September 2008, the Irish government provided a 
blanket guarantee to the existing and future liabilities of domestic Irish 
banks.181 However, this guarantee was not enough to stem the tide of nega-
tive investor sentiment and Irish banks continued to face difficulties in rais-
ing capital from the financial markets.182 
By 2010, Irish banks were borrowing from ECB in much larger vol-
umes than seen before.183 By November 2010, the Irish government had re-
quested support from the EMU and an Economic Adjustment Program was 
formally agreed by December.184 The bailout consisted of contributions 
from the two predecessors of ESM (€22.5 billion from EFSM and €17.7 bil-
lion from EFSF), bilateral loans from the United Kingdom (€3.8 billion), 
Sweden (€0.6 billion) and Denmark (€0.4 billion), and loans from the IMF 
(€22.5 billion).185 
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The Spanish economy went through a very similar cycle of a real es-
tate market bubble, construction boom, irresponsible bank lending practic-
es, and the eventual bursting of the bubble as the Irish economy.186 Spanish 
banks were typically considered a model for conservative lending among 
the Western economies because they were required to maintain capital to a 
much larger extent than comparable banks in other countries.187 However, 
during the bubble in the real estate market, the capital requirements for 
Spanish banks were relaxed, leading to a situation where banks were sad-
dled with bad mortgages and were frozen out of the credit markets.188 
Until 2012, the Spanish government tried multiple times to recapitalize 
its banks.189 Unfortunately, these measures did not lead to lowering of bor-
rowing costs.190 The rating agencies downgraded Spain’s ratings multiple 
times in this period and its debt to GDP ratio reached unsustainable levels 
for the country.191 
In July 2012, EMU approved aid for Spain of up to €100 billion to be 
disbursed through ESM.192 The program was designed to provide capital to 
the banking sector of Spain.193 The Spanish government used about €41.3 
billion (39.5 billion in December 2012 and 1.8 billion in February 2013).194 
The ESM raised capital for the bailout by issuing debt securities in the form 
of bills and floating rate notes.195 The bailout funds were provided to the 
Spanish government’s bank recapitalization fund which then further dis-
bursed it to the impacted banks.196 The bailout was accompanied with poli-
cy conditionality focused on Spanish banking sector reforms.197 
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Portugal 
Portugal requested aid from the EU, the EMU, and the IMF in April 
2011.198 The Economic Adjustment Program was agreed upon by May 2011 
and included €52 billion from EFSF and EFSM (€26 billion from each) 
along with another €26 billion from the IMF.199 An MoU was signed be-
tween Portugal and the lending bodies to enact fiscal reforms in the country 
to jumpstart the economy.200 
Portugal’s woes were a result of market contagion from the troubles of 
Greece and Ireland.201 Robert M. Fishman, writing in the opinion pages of 
the New York Times, argued that Portugal had been driven into a crisis be-
cause of rating agencies and speculative traders who had driven up borrow-
ing costs for the country.202 He argued that Portugal had strong fundamen-
tals and would not have needed the bailout at all if it were not for market 
distorting forces of actors such as rating agencies and speculators.203   
Cyprus 
The financial crisis in Cyprus was largely a result of the crisis in the 
banking sector of the country. After the United States’ crisis in 2008, the 
economy of Cyprus went into a recession.204 Growth kept declining in the 
next few years, while unemployment kept rising, property values declined, 
and the volume of nonperforming loans rose on the balance sheets of the 
banks.205 The banking sector of Cyprus had large exposure to Greek debt 
and with the crisis in Greece, their assets were devaluing rapidly.206 The as-
sets took a haircut of 50% in 2011 in the midst of the Greek crisis.207 Be-
tween March and June of 2012, rating agencies downgraded Cyprus’ ratings 
twice.208 Eventually, after being frozen out of the credit markets, the Cypri-
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ot government requested a bailout from ESM on June 25, 2012.209   
A bailout package of up to €10 billion was agreed by the EMU, with 
ESM providing €9 billion and IMF providing the remaining €1 billion.210 
Eventually, due to healthy economic recovery, bank recapitalization, and 
access to private markets, Cyprus only needed to use 6.3 billion of the 9 bil-
lion provided by ESM.211 
VII. IMPACT OF THE ESM BAILOUTS 
The impact of the ESM bailouts on the economies of the countries dis-
cussed in the section above raises similar issues as the ones discussed under 
the impact of TARP on the US economy: social unrest, moral hazards, and 
accountability issues. However, one key difference stands out in the context 
of EMU—the impact of austerity measures on the economic, political, and 
social climate of these countries. 
The fiscal policy conditionality attached to the Economic Adjustment 
Programs frequently includes austerity measures that bring about drastic re-
ductions in public spending.212 Austerity economics is a dangerous, sliding 
slope, especially when a country’s economy is in recession. When the GDP 
is growing sluggishly, cutting back on public spending entrenches unem-
ployment.213 With increasing unemployment, the population generally cuts 
back consumption and saves more of their disposable income, further con-
tracting the economy.214 In the midst of this phenomenon, the decrease in 
social welfare payments as a result of austerity measures creates social 
backlash within the country. 
The catastrophic impact of austerity measures was very clearly seen 
across almost all the participants in the bailout programs of the EMU. There 
was a double-dip recession after the implementation of austerity measures: 
in 2012 and 2013, respectively; the economy of Cyprus contracted 2.4 and 
6 percent; the economy of Greece contracted 6.4 and 3.7 percent, the econ-
omy of Portugal economy contracted 3.2 and 1.6 percent;  and the economy 
of Spain contracted 1.6 and 1.2 percent.215 There were widespread protests 
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across these countries, calling for cessation of the austerity measures.216 
Many of these protests were indicative of a rising wave of populism across 
the politics of the European Union.217 
These protests were closely related to the stigma attached to these 
bailouts, with the general population feeling disenfranchised over the distri-
bution of funds. There was a feeling of discontent that the funds received 
went disproportionately into strengthening banks and their executives while 
the middle class did not see any results.218  
To mitigate the problem of moral hazard, the bailouts were initially 
provided with punitive premiums of up to 300 basis points.219 However, not 
only did these punitive interest rates create a situation where it was harder 
for the struggling economies to make payments on the loans, they also led 
to a perception that the rest of EMU and the IMF profited from the unfortu-
nate situation in crisis-stricken countries.220 Eventually, the assistance from 
EMU and related intergovernmental organizations (ESM, EFSF, EFSM) 
were given without the punitive premiums.221 
Finally, the billions that were handed out in aid have not trickled down 
into the economy for these countries.222 The funds have been used to make 
payments on international loans and sovereign bond payments to large 
bank, who held the majority of the sovereign European debt.223 A lot of the 
capital has also been diverted into bolstering the balance sheets of banks 
teetering on the verge of bankruptcy.224 However, it is not clear how these 
funds have been utilized beyond ensuring the credit markets that the bank-
ing sector of the European countries receiving aid are not recapitalized. 
VIII. TARP AND ESM COMPARED 
TARP and ESM arose from similar needs to bolster struggling econo-
mies in which traditional financial markets had failed to provide capital and 
have similar goals. This section compares the two organizations in two key 
facets: their accountability structures and their impact on the economy. 
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As summarized in the earlier section on TARP, there were robust ac-
countability structures around the program. In fact, due to pressures from 
regular audits of the program, the Treasury had to modify its behavior and 
strategies while implementing it.225 In comparison, ESM does not seem to 
have the same amount of scrutiny on its actions.226 This section discusses 
the accountability structures in place for ESM and argues that they are nei-
ther democratic in nature, nor are they enough to affect decision-making by 
the Board of Governors and Board of Directors. 
There are certain accountability tools that are entrenched in the struc-
ture of the EU Agencies.227 Some of these tools are consultation procedures, 
transparency duties, access to information, and the obligations to report to 
the European Parliament.228 Since ESM was established through intergov-
ernmental treaty between the ESM members, it falls outside the purview of 
the traditional European law and EU Institutions.229 Instead, it is governed 
by international law.230 This structure of ESM drastically reduces the level 
of oversight that the EU bodies, such as the European Parliament (“EP”),231 
European Court of Justice (“ECJ”),232 or the European Council of Auditors 
(“ECA”),233 could exercise over it. 
Three provisions in the ESM Treaty could be interpreted as establish-
ing a sort of accountability structure.234 First, a public annual report contain-
ing an audited statement of its accounts along with providing the member 
states with quarterly profit and loss statements.235 Second, ESM is required 
to set up an internal audit function that is compatible with international 
standards.236 This audit function is the ESM’s Board of Auditors.237 ESM is 
also required to be audited by external auditors approved by the Board of 
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Governors.238 These external auditors have the full power to inspect ESM’s 
accounts.239 Finally, ESM is obliged to make the annual report published by 
the Board of Auditors available to national parliaments and audit institu-
tions of the member states.240    
These provisions leave a lot to be desired. While they establish proce-
dures for transparency, they do not establish a dialogue between the various 
EU institutions and ESM.241 The European Commission (“EC”) or the EP 
cannot directly interrogate ESM on its actions.242 Furthermore, they do not 
have the power to change ESM’s behavior through sanctions or hearings.243 
ESM is not answerable to the European Court of Justice unless a member 
state files a suit against it.244 There is broad legal immunity for the board of 
governors and board of directors.245 Contrast this with the power Congress 
wielded over the actions taken under TARP and the tangible ways in which 
TARP was modified due to Congressional oversight and hearings.246 
Impact on the Economy 
As elaborated in the sections above on the impact of TARP and ESM 
on the economy of the United States and the impact EMU countries respec-
tively, both programs led to negative signals in the financial markets for the 
participants, whether they were sovereigns or financial institutions.247 Both 
programs also created incentives for market distorting behavior, such as 
moral hazard.248 
There are also similarities between the two programs in the amount of 
control exercised by the lending party over the funds disbursed. ESM and 
TARP did not exercise complete control over how the aid recipients used 
the capital provided to them. One of the key criticisms discussed earlier in 
the paper for TARP was the CPP, through which billions of dollars were 
injected into the balance sheet of banks without any control over how those 
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funds were used by the banks.249 Comparatively, ESM arguably exercises 
greater control over the disbursed funds through the policy conditionalities 
that are tied together with the funds in the signed MoUs. However, this con-
trol exercised by ESM might actually be counterproductive.  Through the 
policy conditionalities attached to the aid, participating EMU countries 
were mandated to institute austerity measures.250 However, the oversight 
over how financial institutions used the funds disbursed to them through 
ESM was not this rigorous. Also, austerity measures prolonged the reces-
sion in several of the participating EMU nations.251 
While TARP was based on a philosophy of quantitative easing, ESM 
was structured with fiscal conservatism in mind. These divergent attitudes 
are understandable given the fundamental difference between the United 
States and any individual nation member of the EMU: while the United 
States can control its fiscal and monetary policies, members of EMU only 
control the fiscal policy. Without a closer alignment of the fiscal policies of 
the EMU nations, ESM’s success will be limited. The economy of the EU is 
still highly fragile and cannot be considered to have completely recovered. 
It would be invaluable for the region to have greater fiscal integration. 
The European Union has made strong progress towards better fiscal in-
tegration in the wake of the sovereign debt crisis through the establishment 
of a banking union for the region.252 However, one of the key requirements 
for a banking union, deposit insurance, is missing from the current imple-
mentation.253 There is strong opposition from some member states over an 
EU-wide deposit insurance (nations with healthy economies are worried 
over having to insure assets in unhealthy economies).254 
However, it would be prudent for the EU to strengthen the union as 
soon as possible because of recent developments in the region. First, Italy’s 
banks seem to be heading towards a similar banking crisis as faced by those 
in Spain and Cyprus.255 Second, while the economic situation remains tense 
in the region, the political situation has also taken a turn for the worse.256 
The United Kingdom voting to leave the EU (“Brexit”) has fanned national-
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ist and populist movements throughout the EU.257 This will only worsen the 
existing anti-EU sentiment that had arisen as a result of the widespread aus-
terity measures.258 A well-functioning banking union that establishes fiscal 
integration could be a uniting factor in this climate.259 
IX. CONCLUSION 
EU and EMU have the difficult task of functioning as a well-integrated 
federation of member states while maintaining the sovereignty of the mem-
bers over important matters such as fiscal policy. Efforts to create a more 
robust integration such as the banking union have exposed the internal divi-
sions within the union further. Like TARP, ESM is a fire-fighting mecha-
nism and to be successful it requires better accountability structures to en-
sure that funds are channelled into the right growth areas. In the long-run, 
the EU cannot rely on capital injections to ensure financial stability in the 
region. Greater fiscal integration would ensure that conditions that give rise 
to crises like the one facing the EU today do not arise again in the future. 
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